Strategic offensive operation (August - December, 1943) which received in the history the name "Fight for Dnipro" was one of the brightest pages of the Great Patriotic War.
In the summer of 1943 shattering defeat of German-fascist armies in Kursk fight finally buried offensive strategy of the enemy. The Red Army developed a powerful attack on the front from Velyki Luky to the Sea of Azov. On August 5 were liberated Belgorod and Orel, and for the first time since the war beginning, Moscow saluted to armies-liberators.
The German armies were compelled to pass to strategic defense on all fronts. On August 11, 1943 Hitler issued the order on acceleration of construction of a strategic defensive boundary (so-called "East Bank"), passing to the north of Chudsk Lake, down the river Narva, to the east of Pskov, Nevel, Vitebsk, Orsha, further through Gomel, on the rivers Sozh and Dnipro in its average current, along the river Molochna. The special attention was paid to the defense organization along the Dnipro the right coast of which is much higher then the left one. By the end of September, there was created the developed in the engineering relation, branched defense sated with anti-tank and antipersonnel means.
Liberation of the Left-bank of Ukraine and speeding up the Dnipro was an important military and political task, which the General headquarters formulated before the Soviet armies even during Kursk fight. Performance of this task was entrusted to armies of five fronts: Central (commander K.K.Rokosovsky), Voronezh (M.F.Vatutin), Steppe (I.S. Konev), South-Western (R.Ya.Malinovsky) and Southern (F.I.Tolbukhin). Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K.Zhukov and O.M.Vasilevsky coordinated actions of the fronts. As a part of armies of these fronts were 2633000 soldiers and officers, 51200 guns and mortars, 2400 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 2850 warplanes.
Against the five Soviet fronts, the German command concentrated the 2nd German army from group of armies “Centre” and the whole group of armies "South", which was headed by the Field-Marshal-General E.Manstein. The main group of the German armies was concentrated in the South-Western direction where, against Voronezh, Steppe, South Western and Southern fronts, it totaled 1240000 soldiers and officers, 12600 guns and the mortars, about 2100 tanks and assault tools and 2000 warplanes.
On August 23, after persistent fights, Kharkov was liberated, and in Moscow volleys of artillery salute sounded again. But on the West, the South-West and the South of the city still proceeded intense fights. The favorable for defense district on the coast of the rivers Merefa, Uda, Vorskla and others, strong points in Meref, Valky, Krasnograd, Poltava significantly detained approach of our armies and their exit to the Dnipro.
On September 5, the Soviet armies after heavy fighting liberated the city and Meref's important railway junction opening a way of approach to the Dnipro, but ahead were still Poltava and Kremenchug in the direction of which groups of the eighth army of Germans receded. On September 6, the Western front armies broke through a so-called position "Turtle" and quickly promoted to the area to the south of a town Pavlograd. Defeat of the German armies near Kharkov and Merefa and successful actions of other fronts of the Soviet armies caused the need to correct the Headquarters directive of August 12 and to establish from September 6 new differentiating lines between fronts and to change the directions of attack on the fronts. Voronezh front aimed at Kyiv then.
On September 15, the German armies obtained the order on the general withdrawal and a crossing to the right bank of the Dnipro. They receded in the directions of permanent crossings near Kyiv, Kanev, Kremenchug, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk. Retreat was accompanied by "tactics of a scorched earth": according to previously developed plan, not only military facilities were destroyed, but the cities and villages, the industrial enterprises, bridges, mines were flooded, the farmland was burned. The huge territory of Podniprivia was turned into deadly emptiness.
With the beginning of the general retreat of the group of armies "South" on the Left-bank of Ukraine, the first stage of fight for the Dnipro was finished. The Headquarters set new tasks before the offensive Soviet fronts. The main forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts concentrated on Kyiv direction, the Steppe front - on Kremenchug, the South-Western - on Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia, the Southern front - on Melitopol and Crimea directions.
By the end of September, the Soviet armies came to the left bank of the Dnipro on the 700 -kilometer front from Loiev to Zaporizhia.
For acceleration of armies offensive, in the first half of September, the Headquarters transferred from its reserves to the structure of the Central and Voronezh fronts 61st and 52nd armies, 3rd Guards tank army, two tank-, mechanized- and two cavalry cases. To the structure of the Steppe front were transferred the 37th army and one army from each front - Voronezh and the South-Western.
Unfortunately, to carry out tasks of the Headquarters – to ruin the German plan of the organized retreat of armies behind the Dnipro, not to give the enemy to have a rest, to force the Dnipro straight off and to create powerful bridgeheads on its right bank – the tired and exhausted armies didn't manage. Using inconsistency and indecision of actions of the Soviet command, E.Manstein started armies’ crossing over the Dnipro which was carried out almost without losses. The main part (up to 90 %) of the German armies managed to get to the right bank of the Dnipro and settle down along it on well strengthened positions.
With an exit to the Dnipro on September 21-22, 1943, armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts started its forcing at once and seizing bridgeheads on the right bank. Later the bridgeheads on the right bank seized armies of Steppe and South-Western fronts. By September 30, 23 bases, including important for liberalization of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, - Liutizh and Bukryn bases were created. On it the second stage of the fight for the Dnipro was finished. The bridgehead plans about forced crossing the Dniprо in the main direction, Kyiv, and the further prompt development of offensive, the armies of Voronezh front exhausted by difficult fights didn't manage to fulfill.
For fast and resolute defeat of the enemy, in the first echelon of armies of the front were included the 3rd Guards tank army and three separate tank cases – 5th, 2nd and 10th guards. At sunrise on September 22, the advanced motor-rifle battalion of the 3rd Guards tank army of P.S.Rybalko successfully forced the Dnipro and seized a small bridgehead, but there were no forces for its expansion. Slightly above the Dnipro current, divisions of the 40th army of K.S.Moskalenko seized slightly less in size bridgehead in the area of Rzhyshchiv. On other sectors of the front was no essential success, and it complicated the Dnipro overcoming by the main forces.
At sunrise on September 24, the opponent concentrated some divisions, including one tank, in front of Bukryn and Rzhyshchiv bases. For support and simplification of the Dnipro forced crossing, creation and a base maintenance on its right bank, further offensive of the armies in Bukryn direction by order of the Headquarters, airborne armies entered the fight.
In the night of September 24, in the area of Kanev the first party of air landing was overthrew with a task to take and maintain until the coming of the main forces of the bases at a boundary of Rzhyshchiv-Mezhyrich-Morshny- Cherkasy. For landing of about 10 thousand militaries, more than 200 guns and mortars, 540 machine guns were allocated to 180 planes Li-2 and 35 gliders. Landing was made in the dark. Because of a bad preparation of the operation the paratroopers dissipated on a very big area, due to loss of orientation, a part of the paratroopers hit the location of the troops, a part - the waters of the Dnipro, marsh, and others were dropped directly on the German positions. During the landing, the majority of the anti-tank weapon fell into hands of the enemy or was lost, the radio communication between separate groups of parachutists and the staff was decoupled. Separate landing divisions instantly engaged in the fight after landing or showed the desperate resistance to Germans, but forces were too unequal. Operation failed.
The disaster at Bukryn bridgehead was a heavy blow for the Soviet airborne troops. Remaining paratroopers were withdrawn from the front, the landing troops were in reserve of the Headquarters and until the end of the war with Germany serious assault operations were not carried out.
The failures of the first days of fighting at the captured bridgeheads on the Right Bank did not change plans of the Headquarters on further deployment of offensive. The troops of Voronezh Front had a task to get control of Kyiv and go to line Ovruch-Korosten-Zhytomyr-Koziatyn.
As long as capturing Kyiv, located on the high bank of the Dnipro, with a direct blow was impossible, it was planned to strike two blows: the main from the Bukryn bridgehead and located slightly higher to the north Shchukyn bypassing Kyiv from the southwest, and the second - from the Liutizh bridgehead in the southern direction along the river Irpin, bypassing Kyiv from the northwest. For the end of the fifth day of the offensive seizing of Kyiv was planned, armies of shock group had to cut the highway Kyiv - Zhytomyr and prevent the enemy from departure to the west.
Circumstances, under which the offensive of Voronezh front was being prepared, were very difficult. Till September 29, no army of the front had pontoon bridges on the Dnipro, and that didn't allow carrying out a crossing in necessary sizes to the Bukryn bridgehead of armies, military equipment and fuel. Because of a lack of fuel armies of the front did not have the effective help from aircraft.
When armies of the front tried to broaden the Bukryn bridgehead and were preparing an offensive, the German command by the end of September threw from the Western Europe in Kyiv direction three tank- and three infantry divisions and many thousands replenishments with intention to liquidate the bridgehead and to dump its defenders into the Dnipro. On September 29, 1943, the enemy with forces of two tank and two infantry divisions, with a fire support of artillery and mortars struck a blow at Bukryn bridgehead, and on October 2 infantry and tank divisions began offensive in the North-West direction of Rzhishchiv at the Shchuchyn bridgehead. Difficult bloody fights continued till October 4.
Ten days after the start of forcing the Dnipro by the Soviet troops, enemy significantly strengthened its position and relocated new forces in threatening directions of Bukryn and Liutizh bridgeheads.
On October 11, 1943, an offensive of Voronezh front armies to the north of Kyiv began, but all attempts of the 60th and the 38th armies to break through the defense of the enemy were not successful. On October 12, the 60th and 38th armies resumed offensive, and 40th, 3rd Guards tank armies, 27th and 47th armies of the left wing of the front took the offensive, striking the main blow. In the heavy fight at the front from Rzhyshchev to Kyiv both parties suffered huge losses. The German command engaged all its forces to action and started throwing tank divisions from other sectors of the front in this direction. On October 13, fights proceeded with the new force and in even more difficult conditions.
The great value for all area of Voronezh front had a construction of a bridge with a big loading capacity at Bukryn bridgehead near Kozyntsi village. Pontoneers, sappers, workers and collective farmers, who helped to build the bridge, under continuous bombardments in a fabulously short term (11 days), constructed the bridge. In the evening of October 14, the crossing of armies to the right bank began. In total, at a strip of Voronezh front, 13 low-water bridges on the Dnipro to the South and the North from Kyiv and 15 bridges on the Desna were constructed.
Fighting at Bukryn and Liutizh bridgeheads continued without success until October 15-16 and then was suspended in order to take measures to continue the offensive. October 20, 1943, fronts were renamed, and starting from October 21, Voronezh became known as the 1st Ukrainian; Steppe, Southwest and South - respectively 2, 3 and 4th Ukrainian.
Success of armies of the neighboring fronts demanded acceleration of seizing Kyiv and creation of a big bridgehead in this direction. Therefore, on October 21 at the Bukryn bridgehead began a new offensive that brought some tactical success. At the end of the day, parts of the 40th army joined together with parts that were at Shchuchyn bridgehead. Parts of the 27th army achieved some success. At Liutizh bridgehead, the forces repulsed the enemy’s continuous counterattacks. The following two days of fighting brought no success.
After the October fights, the 1st Ukrainian front safely affirmed its three operational bridgeheads: Bukryn (40th, 27th and 3rd Guards tank army), Liutizh (38th army) and a bridgehead in the mouth of the river Prypiat (13th and 60th armies). As it became clear that the main offensive from Bukryn bridgehead was impractical, having analyzed the possibility of the latter two bridgeheads, the Headquarters decided that the most appropriate for an offensive in Kyiv is Liutizh bridgehead. It is located at a distance of 15-20 km north of Kyiv and, in case of success of actions from that bridgehead, the Soviet troops were able on the second or third day of operation to bypass Kyiv from the northwest, cut highway Kyiv-Zhytomyr and capture Kyiv. Further it would be possible to go in the western and southwest directions. For implementation of that plan, it was necessary to provide operational suddenness, secretly strengthen armies at the bridgehead, leaving the enemy no time for leading new forces directly to Kyiv. As at that time the Headquarters had no free reserves, necessary forces and means for implementation of the plan had to be found by the front.
On October 24, late at night, the Headquarters issued the directive for the front, according to which the front had to begin immediately the transfer of its armies from the left wing to the right and finish their concentration by November 1-2. For that purpose, the 3rd Guards tank army was transferred to a sector of the front to the north of Kyiv to use it together with the 1st Guards cavalry case. The northern (right) wing of the front at the expense of the southern (left) was amplified by three-four rifle divisions, as well as two rifle divisions from the Headquarters reserve. Besides that, the 60th and 38th armies were involved in offensive in Kyiv. Offensive actions at Bukryn base, thus, had to conduct the armies which have remained at the bridgehead to distract on itself the maximum of the enemy’s forces.
According to an operational and tactical project, the new plan of operation had no parallel in the history of warfare. Within 8-10 days, the armies of Bukryn bridgehead had to make a forced march at the distance of 150-200 km, cross the Desna and again over the Dnipro – to Liutizh bridgehead.
Among these tasks the most difficult was connected with a subsequent regrouping of armies. At Bukryn bridgehead, imaginary firing positions of art batteries were equipped, a part of radio stations remained on their places and continued a usual radio exchange, strengthened defensive works were conducted, statement of mines and wire entanglements were carried out, imaginary crossings on the Dnipro were under construction, transfers of armies from the left bank to the bridgehead were imitated. For masking of crossings, smoke screens were widely used and placed where crossings of armies didn't occur. The German command was unable to learn of the extent and nature of the Soviet troops regrouping, and exactly at that time taken from Kyiv to Kaharlyk region the 7th tank division.
Success of the regrouping was greatly facilitated by the work of the Soviet engineering parts, which had in very difficult conditions put a pontoon bridge across the Dnipro, built two wooden bridges with deck below the water level, making them almost invisible, and launched two ferries.
Fight directly for Kyiv began on November 1, 1943 with offensive of the Soviet armies at Bukryn bridgehead. After 40-minute artillery and air preparation began offensive of joint first echelon of the 40th and 27th armies. The enemy, who kept there a strong force since the period of October fights, with the help of shattering fire, tanks and counterattacks stopped offensive. By order of M.F.Vatutin, active operations of armies at Bukryn bridgehead proceeded. From November 3 to November 5, armies showed seeming concentrations of operational reserves, and attempts to break through defense of the enemy proceeded till November 10. Army of the 40th and the 27th army didn't break through enemy defense, but executed, at the price of big efforts, in general, tasks to chain significant forces of the enemy to Bukrin's region, without having allowed using them in the northern direction where the destiny of Kyiv was decided.
In 1948 the author of these lines was at places of fights in the Green oak grove near Hodorov, sung in a poem of the same name by M. Bazhan, and saw the broken military equipment and the earth covered with a continuous layer of splinters, sleeves of various calibers, cartridges, shot helmets, metal military tools. We, then small children, secretly from adults, under the leadership of more adult children went there to collect copper and brass things, which were accepted in exchange for any economic accessories by suppliers of non-ferrous metals, who travelled then through villages.
3 November 1943 strike force troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front Lyutezhskogo springboard dealt a powerful blow from the north of Kiev.
From 8 AM during 40-minute artillery fire directed at crushing the enemy's defenses.
In the offensive zone of thirty-eighth Army (commander K.S. Moskalenko), which was the main attacking force on the six-kilometer section of the breakthrough was concentrated more than 2,000 guns and mortars, 500 rocket artillery systems that are allowed to create unprecedented artillery density - more than 300 units per 1 km of the breakthrough. A powerfull blow destroyed the defenses, the enemy suffered great losses in manpower, weapons, military equipment.
The first echelon of Soviet troops went on the attack.
In the afternoon the enemy made the first counter-attack from Pushe-Vodice, which was repulsed with heavy losses. The offensive continued, heavy fighting continued into the night.
Strike force was covered from the west by the 60th Army (commander I.D.Chernyahovskiy) , where the enemy fiercely resisted.
Big help to offensive troops was made by the 2nd Air Army, which, when weather allowed, at 3 November performed 1150 aircraft sorties over the battlefield and on the reserves of the enemy moved from areas of the Belaya Tserkov and Korsun-Shevchenkyvskyi.
During the first day of the offensive on Lyutezhskogo springboard 38th Army broke through the first defensive position of the enemy at the front of 10 km and start fighting for the second position.
60th Army on its left flank broke the defense on the front 18 km. Both armies advanced deep into the 5-12 km, but the tasks, planned for the first day of the offensive were not fully implemented.
November 3 the enemy has already partially used its reserves, and others were on the way. All this meant that on November 4 fights should be extremely difficult and cruel. At the morning of November 4 troops resumed the offensive, and enemy strongly counterattacked, especially in Pushe-Vodice.
The Guard 5th Armored Corps and 340th Infantry Division were introduced into the battle, which were transferred here from the right side of thirty-eighth army.
The breakthrough has been expanded from the Dnieper to the river Irpen into the depth of 2-5 km, and part of the 51st Rifle Corps reached the north suburb of Kiev - Priorki.
In this day 6th and 7th Guards Armored Corps were engaged in heavy fighting on the outskirts of Svyatoshyno. Fierce fighting on the outskirts of Kiev continued overnight. 7th Guards Tank Corps cut the highway Kyiv-Zhytomyr and went to Kiev. Tanks were traveling with its lights and sirens, carrying heavy fire. The enemy could not resist and started to depart. Morning of November 5 Svyatoshyno was liberated. On the night of November 4, below the Dnieper in Kiev, near the island of Cossack troops of the thirty-eighth army crossed the Dnieper and took on its right bank a few settlements, cutting the road along the Dnieper River from Kiev to the south. But there were no forces to develop the success on this direction. On the morning of November 5 in the battle for Kiev a sharp turnaround occured. Fearing encirclement, the enemy began to withdraw troops in the south-west direction, at the same time throwing in the district of Kiev troops from Bukrin bridgehead. That same morning 140 Il-2 dealt a major air strike in the northern and north-western outskirts of Kiev.
November 5 troops of thirty-eighth army and part of the 3rd Guards Armory Corps advanced in some areas to a depth of 25 km, and the 50th Rifle Corps, bypassing Kiev from the west, came into the station Juliani and Borshhagivka.
Two infantry and one cavalry corps were introduced in the battle from the line Bilogorodka Bobritsa as well as from the river Irpen along the road Kyiv-Zhytomyr.
At the same time 51th Infantry, 5th Guards Tank Corps, 167th Infantry Division and 50th Infantry Corps carryied out the fighting from the left wing.
Together with them, 1st Czechoslovak independent brigade under the direction of Colonel Ludvik Svoboda led the offensive.
The brigade knocked out the enemy from Syrets railway station and the streets in the western part of the city.
At the end of the day, these troops have broken in the central districts of the city, but the fighting in the streets of Kiev continued all the night of November 6. Backing enemy hiding behind the rear guard continued to burn, blow up and destroy the city.
Only a strong, swift, rapid advance of Soviet troops helped save Kiev from total destruction. On November 6, 0 hours and 30 minutes red flag hoisted over Kiev, and at four o'clock commander of thirty-eighth army Colonel-General KS Moskalenko, having been personally on Khreshchatyk and making sure that the troops completely captured the city, reported M.F.Vatutinu about the liberation of the capital of Ukraine.
The same day, Moscow saluted the troops who liberated Kiev, 24 volleys of 324 guns. The troops who participated in the liberation of Kiev, the order of the Supreme Commander declared gratitude many formations and units was awarded the honorary title of "Kiev".
The troops who participated in the liberation of Kyiv, by the order Supreme Commander was declared gratitude, many formations and units was awarded the honorary title of "Kyiv". For courage and bravery 17,5 thousand soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, 663 the most brave of them were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them - the intelligence officer N.M.Sholudenko (posthumously), who was a student absentee of KPI before the war, and Czechoslovak soldiers - lieutenant Antonin Sohor and nadporuchnyk Richard Tesarzhyk.
According to recent reports the loss of Soviet troops in the liberation of Kyiv on November 6, 1943 amounted to 260 thousand people.
November 6th the first stage of the Kiev offensive 1st Ukrainian Front was ended. The troops of the enemy suffered a heavy defeat, on the Dnieper bridgehead was formed, which was of great strategic importance. The enemy tried to eliminate the break, pulling to the south and southwest of Kyiv large forces, especially tanks that were transferred from France, Bukrynsky beachhead, from the Kremenchug, increasing the number of planes on the neares to Kyiv airfields.
Soviet commandement closely followed the fighting around Kyiv and Ukraine on the right bank and demanded that the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front not to delay started operation in Kyiv, because the bridgehead was crucial for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine. Therefore, November 6th our troops continued their strong offensive passing more than 50 miles a day. The enemy pursued in divergent directions on Korosten, Zhitomir, Fast, White Church. 7 November 3rd Guards Tank Army captured an important railway junction and a powerful stronghold of the enemy - Fast town. This made it possible to develop our troops attack on Kozyatyn and Belaya Tcerkov and help make a turnover in the actions of troops on the bridgehead Bukrin. But 10-12 November enemy actually stopped our attack at Kozyatyn and Belotserkovsky direction. Captured earlier settlements Popelnya and Pavoloch were lost. Major efforts have focused on keeping positions the army reached near Fastov. There was heavy fighting east of Fastov during several days, but the enemy has not reached success.
November 13th our troops liberated Zhitomir, taking stocks of ammunition, fuel, food, a large number of vehicles, guns and even serviceable aircraft. Many formations and units got the name "Zhitomir" and Moscow saluted in honor of this victory, 20 artillery volleys.
At the same time the enemy inflicted blows along the right bank of the Dnieper and forced our troops to retreat to the line-Hermanivka Vytachiv-Tripoli. Repeated attempts to break through enemy defenses on Bukrin bridgehead were unsuccessful. Therefore, the bridgehead left only the 27th Army and other troops moved into the area south of Kyiv, the direction of the front main attack.
The German General HQ requested the command of Army Group "South" decisive action. Commander E.Manshteyn developed a plan, according to which the enemy began to concentrate armored forces, including tank divisions that came from the West and the Balkans, in the Kiev area.
After capture of Zhitomirt the method of the action in the center of the 1st Ukrainian Front was changed - our troops went to the defensive. This completed the second phase of the Kiev offensive in which our troops defeated the 15 divisions of the enemy, captured 41 thousand soldiers and officers, destroyed or seized 1200 guns and mortars, 600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 90 aircraft, 1900 cars and many other military equipment. A small bridgehead near Lyutizha was extended to strategic - up to 400 km on the front and 150 km depth.
After analyzing the situation, Suprem HQ made a conclusion that Kiev Offensive at this stage is completed, its immediate goal achieved. Succeed was to be fixed.
Given the degree of fragmentation during offensive of 1st Ukrainian Front, troops fatigue, unprepared defense lines, the great length of the rear of the front, the enemy started to make counterattacks, finding weakest point in the defense of the troops. On the night of 12 November , the enemy struck a heavy blow from the area Andrushevka toward the Kornin in joint 21th and 50th Rifle Corps 38th Army. Front line of 21 Corps was very stretched, and in Kornin there weren't troops at all. Two German armored divisions took Kornin and began to move northward toward Brusilov, creating the threat of dismemberment of 38th Army and Fastiv and Zhytomyr groups. With a huge efforts artillery, tanks and infantry the enemy attack was stopped. Brusilovsky direction was significantly strengthened. 10 infantry, 3 cavalry and 2 artillery division had to defend Zhytomyr region to the east of it. Our troops, defending Fastov and the front from Fastov to the Dnieper River, were significantly strengthened.
At the same time the enemy also strengthened his Korninsk and Zhytomyr group to deliver the main blow to Brusilov, get out on the highway Kyiv-Zhytomyr and acting toward the Kyiv, bypass the rear Fasto group of Soviet troops. The second challenge was to surround Zhytomyr group. To carry out this plan 7 tanks, 1 motorized , 6 infantry and 1 security division were amassed on a narrow front.
On the morning of November 15th the enemy struck the first blows in the direction of Brusilov and Levkova. The attack came in the area of settlement Ivnytsya toward the Zhitomir, and from the line-Hodorkiv Kornin - to the north. The fighting at once took a very brutal character. The forces were unequal, enemy tanks were advancing in groups from 60 to 150 machines, their offensive was continuously supported by the groups of 20-30 aircraft.
38th army troops were forced to retreat. To help them was aimed 3rd Guards Tank Army, but the situation of Soviet troops in the areas of Brusilov and Zhitomir deteriorated. November 16 near Ivnytsya, after crossing the river Teterev and break our front, the Germans cut the highway Kyiv-Zhytomyr and 17 November took Korostishiv. From 19 to 20 November was captured Zhitomir. Enemy tanks went along the highway east to Kyiv.
The enemy was able to break through the front also on the main direction of its offensive in the area Kornin. But in his way they met an insurmountable obstacle - center of defense Brusilov, where 17-artillery division and a number of enhancement were concentrated. At this area in the middle of the day November 18 enemy threw in offensive simultaneously up to 100 tanks, but lost 50 of them and could not break through nor to Kyiv or in the rear of our troops at Fastov.
Due to the threat of a breakthrough to Kyiv large enemy forces M.F.Vatutin November 21 received permission to use main reserve 94 th Rifle Corps, so it and other troops of the 38th and 60th armies will do a counter-attack on the wing of enemy forces aimed at Kyiv. November 22 the attack of 400 enemy tanks and aircrafts to bypass Brussiloff from the northwest created danger of encirclement. Therefore according to the commandment of the front this place troops left. But to continue the offensive on this day the enemy was already failing. Further attempts to continue the offensive in Kyiv November 23-25, even with large groups of tanks in the band 38th Army to break through to Kyiv and reject our troops on the Dnieper, didn't chage the situation. Heavy losses, especially in tanks forced the German command to stop the November 25 attack along the highway Kyiv-Zhytomyr.
As recalled in his memoirs, Marshal A.A.Hrechko, direct participant in these battles for Kiev, in their intensity they looked like battle of Kursk. This is evidenced by the fact that at a small band front 38th and 3rd Guards Tank armies the German command concentrated almost as many tank (9) and motorized (2) divisions, as the number of troops used in the battle of Kursk against the main forces of all Voronezh Front.
Immediately after the failure of the November counterattack on Kyiv the enemy began to strengthen defenses in this area, create a system of strong points, build mines and explosive barriers.
November 26 a counter-offensive of the Soviet troops was launched in the center of the front, which lasted until 30 November. Fierce battles have not changed the front lines, which in turn stabilized by the line Chernyahov-Radomishl-Stavishche-Yurovka-Luchin. In accordance with the order of Supreme Headquarters, M.F.Vatutin set before Front armies task of sustainable defense and replenishment. Kiev Strategic Offensive 1st Ukrainian Front ended. Forced break occurred as well in the actions of the enemy in the band 38th Army.
However, the threat of enemy attack on Kyiv on this area maintained. German group of 4 armored divisions in the first echelon troops of the 4th Panzer Army was active near Brussiloff.
At a time when the actions of troops on the bridgehead Bukrin were stopped, and attempts to break through the enemy to Kyiv from the West stopped too, the right wing of the Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front continued its offensive. November 17 troops of the 60th Army captured a large railway junction - Korosten and troops of the 13th Army - Ovruch city, its garrison was defeated by partisan unit O.M.Saburov. But the enemy by going to the offensive, not only re-captured Korosten, and even tried twice to get to Kyiv from the northwest. The counter-offensive was carried out in the band 60th Army from 6 to 14 December of the district Chernyahova. About tensions battles show the following facts: December 7, damaged and burned 62 enemy tanks; 8 and 9 December - more than 160, and 10 and 11 December more than 200 tanks and assault guns.
The latest attempt to strike at the Kyiv from Korosten enemy made 19-22 December. German divisions reached Malin and stopped, unable to advance further.
At this approved by HQ of 1st Ukrainian Front and Suprem HQ, a plan of Zhitomir - Berdichev offensive was ready. First step, according to the plan, should be defeat of armored group of German 4th Panzer Army in the Brusilov and Malin-Radomyshl. Operation began December 24, 1943 and lasted until January 14, 1944 Army 1st Ukraine front dealt a powerful blow in Brussiloff direction and captured it on the night of 25 December. The next day it was captured Radomishl and 28 December - Kozyatyn. Breaking through the enemy front and developing offensive troops of the 1st Guard and 18th Army second time liberated Zhitomir December 31, 1943, January 4, 1944 - Belaya Tcerkov, 5 January - Berdichev.
These events finally ended the threat to the peaceful life of Kiev. Intentions, expectations and attempts to turn back the enemy counterattacked and recapture Kyiv were finally buried.
Battle of the Dnieper and the liberation of Kyiv had a huge military-strategic, political, international, moral values. Strategic base was created,which provided release all Ukraine, opened the way for the Red Army in the Carpathians and more - in Europe. It was a powerful blow to Nazi Germany, which played a prominent role in bringing the Victory Day.
Every year we are further and further from those fateful events, but the memory of those who was defending our homeland, our future live forever in the hearts of generations of Ukrainian.
V.M. Minakovsky